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INTRODUCTION 
It was an important, although not monumental, year in the 
development of labor and employment law in the Sixth Circuit. This 
survey looks at some of the more significant cases decided in the past 
year. Specifically, the article reviews eleven decisions arising under 
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 1 and two decisions 
involving arbitrations interpreting the meaning of collective bargaining 
agreements. 
Several of the NLRA cases, especially Johnson & Hardin Co. v. 
NLRB,l NLRB v. Hub Plastics, Inc., 3 and NLRB v. Great Scot, Inc.,4 
altered or further refined the law in controversial areas. As to each 
of these cases, the author has taken the liberty of offering commentary 
as to their implications. The arbitration cases, in contrast, predomi-
nantly followed established doctrine. 
Interestingly, in the NLRA cases, the National Labor Relations 
Board had a singular lack of success, being reversed in eight of the 
eleven cases. Indeed, in the remaining three cases surveyed here, the 
Board's approach was affirmed only in part. In the arbitration cases, 
the arbitral process drew broad support from the court. 
I. CASES AND ANALYSIS 
A. Johnson & Hardin Co. v. NLRB5 
This case addressed the rights of nonemployee union organizers to 
distribute materials on property subject to a company's easement. As 
such, it constituted a further refinement of the teachings of NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co. 6 and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB. 7 
The facts of the case can be easily described. The sole access to 
the respondent's plant, a 22 foot wide driveway, extended 100 feet 
from the property line of the plant over land owned by the State of 
Ohio to a public road. The company maintained the driveway and 
I. 28 u.s.c. § 158 (1994). 
2. 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995). 
3. 52 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 1995). 
4. 39 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 1994). 
5. 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995). 
6. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
7. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
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purchased insurance to cover liability for events occurring on its 
easement. It also posted "no trespassing" signs on the driveway. 
Organizers from the Graphic Communications International Union, 
Local 508, distributed materials to employees while stationed along 
the driveway. After being asked twice to leave, the organizers 
complied. The union then filed unfair labor practice charges 
complaining that the company's actions violated section 8(a)(l) of the 
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act"). The company, 
in turn, filed complaints against the union for criminal trespass. 
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALf') determined that the 
company held only an easement over the property and that, conse-
quently, the exclusion of the union organizers violated the Act. The 
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") affirmed, 
declaring its holding in Jean Country8 inapplicable because the 
company in this instance had only easement rights, not full property 
rights. Relying on state law,9 the Board concluded that an owner of 
an easement could not prevent even a trespasser from using land if it 
did not impede his use as a right of way. In the Board's view, an 
easement is an interest in the land of another, carrying only a right to 
use the land. The Board also found the filing of the criminal trespass 
complaint to have been a violation of the Act. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision in part and 
reversed in part. With regard to the rights of union organizers to 
handbill on property subject to an easement, the court found that the 
Board's determination - that the company lacked a property right 
entitling it to exclude the organizers - was rational and deserving of 
enforcement. With respect to the second issue in the case - whether 
the company's instigation of the criminal trespass lawsuit likewise 
violated section 8(a)(l) of the Act- the court reversed the Board. In 
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB10 the United States Su-
preme Court held that where an employer uses a lawsuit as a tool of 
coercion or retaliation, it may have a chilling effect on the willingness 
of employees to engage in protected activities. In this instance, 
however, countervailing considerations such as the First Amendment 
right to petition the government for redress of grievances militated 
8. 291 N.L.R.B. II (1988). 
9. Wolf v. Roberts, 30 Ohio Op. 499 (C.P. 1945). 
10. 461 u.s. 731 (1983). 
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against the condemnation of the lawsuit as an unfair labor practice. 
Thus, the court held, where the suit has a reasonable basis in law or 
fact and is not frivolous, then such action cannot constitute a violation 
of the Act even if filed with the intent of retaliating against the union. 
B. Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB 11 
In this case, two unions petitioned to represent the production and 
maintenance employees at the respondent's ice cream plant, and the 
parties agreed to hold a representation election. On the day before the 
election, however, the president of the union announced that the union 
had just filed a lawsuit against the company seeking back pay for 
employees. The president also announced that employees were each 
due an estimated $35,000 and presented a union member with a check 
for $18,000, ostensibly representing a back pay award. The union 
won the election by a vote of 192 to 126. 
The respondent filed objections to the union's preelection conduct. 
The Regional Director refused to overturn the results of the election, 
however, and the NLRB affirmed the Regional Director's determina-
tion. Thereafter, the company refused to bargain with the union for 
the purpose of obtaining judicial review of the Regional Director's 
decision. The Board then found the company in violation of section 
8(a)(5) of the Act. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
On petition for review, the Sixth Circuit held that the union's 
conduct interfered with employee free choice and materially affected 
the results of the election. Citing NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing 
Co., 12 the court wrote that bargaining orders have not been enforced 
where a union paid employees for votes, where a union paid an 
employee's traffic fine and costs, and where a union offered hats and 
T -shirts to employees as an inducement. 
Here, the court concluded that the union had, in essence, conferred 
free legal services to employees during the preelection campaign. If 
such items as hats and T -shirts are sufficiently valuable that their 
offer constitutes campaign misconduct, the court reasoned, then so 
must be the services of a lawyer in drafting and pursuing a federal 
lawsuit. The court concluded that the union's First Amendment rights 
11. 46 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 1995). 
12. 414 u.s. 270 (1973). 
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were not implicated and reversed the Board's findings that Nestle had 
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the 
umon. 
C. UPS v. NLRB 13 
This case involved the age-old conflict between employees' 
exercise of NLRA section 7 rights by wearing union insignias and an 
employer's interest in maintaining standards as to appearance and 
attire. 
UPS maintains a "hub" in Memphis, Tennessee. All so-called. 
"feeder" and package car drivers are required to wear brown uniforms 
supplied by UPS. The collective bargaining agreement gives the 
company the right to establish reasonable standards concerning 
appearance and uniforms. 
In this instance, a feeder driver, who also served as chief steward, 
attended a union convention and returned with fifty lapel pins which 
he distributed to other union members. The company issued a written 
notice stating that the pins could not be worn. The driver continued 
to wear the pin, however, and was issued a written warning. 
The ALJ dismissed the complaint, concluding that the dress code 
had been sanctioned by the contract which had been consistently and 
nondiscriminatorily enforced. The NLRB reversed the ALJ, however, 
observing that the pin was inconspicuous, free of any provocative 
message and did not interfere with the company's public image. The 
Board also noted that UPS had authorized drivers to wear safe driving 
pins, United Way pins, and pins in support of Operation Desert 
Storm. Thus, the Board concluded that the company had disc-
riminatorily enforced its personal appearance guidelines and found it 
to have violated section 8(a)(l) of the Act in enforcing its dress code. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit, citing Burger King Corp. v. NLRB, 14 held that 
section 8(a)(l) of the Act is not abridged where an employer 
consistently enforces a policy against wearing unauthorized buttons, 
at least where the employer is motivated by a desire to project to the 
public an image of cleanliness, uniformity, and efficiency. 
13. 41 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1994). 
14. 725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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The Sixth Circuit set aside the Board's decision. In so doing, the 
court emphasized that the company had maintained a consistent effort 
to project an image of cleanliness, uniformity, and efficiency. The 
contract contained no limit or restriction on the company's right to 
promulgate appearance and uniform standards. 
2. Comment 
The wearing of pins and other insignia has given rise to many 
NLRA section 8(a)(l) cases. In such cases, the Board's approach has 
tended to weigh the impact of the prohibition on NLRA section 7 
rights against the importance of uniformity to the business. In this 
case, then, the conclusion that the latter outweighed the former.is not 
surprising. What is troublesome about the Sixth Circuit's decision is 
its virtual disregard of the fact that the company had, in the past, 
permitted and, indeed, occasionally issued pins for employees to wear. 
Traditionally, such discriminatory treatment against union insignia has 
triggered the finding of a violation. 
D. NLRB v. Hub Plastics, Inc. 15 
The union won a representation election by a vote of thirty-two to 
twenty-eight. The company challenged the results on two grounds: 
First, throughout the campaign, the union had filed uhfair labor 
practice charges against the company. Then, three days before the 
election, the NLRB notified the parties that it would issue a complaint 
against the company. The company then met with employees to 
inform them they had not acted unlawfully. Two days before the 
election, however, the union falsely stated that the NLRB had 
determined the company to be guilty of unfair labor practices. In 
addition, the NLRB sample ballot had been marked with an "x" in the 
"yes" box. Later, a second sample ballot was similarly defaced. 
The Regional Director recommended the objections be denied, and 
the Board adopted those recommendations and certified the union. 
The company refused to bargain for the purpose of challenging the 
Board's determination and, in the ensuing unfair labor practice 
proceeding, the Board found the company in violation of section 
8(a)(5) of the Act. The Board, however, waited two and a half years 
before seeking enforcement of its order. 
15. 52 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit set aside the Board's order, concluding that the 
union's preelection misconduct had sufficiently tainted the electoral 
process that the right to a fair election was affected. In so conclud-
ing, the court continued to take a very different view toward 
campaign misrepresentations than the NLRB. 
In Midland National Life Insurance Co., 16 the Board announced 
that it would no longer probe the truth or falsity of campaign 
statements, and that it would only intervene to judge campaign 
rhetoric if a party used forged documents rendering voters unable to 
recognize propaganda. The Sixth Circuit, however, has rejected this 
view. Thus, in Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 17 the 
court held that where misrepresentation is so pervasive and the 
deception so artful that employees will be unable to discern truth from 
fiction, their right to a fair choice is affected. 
Here, the court found that a union official lied to employees and 
that this falsehood was supported by an altered Board sample ballot. 
In so doing, the union's actions may have rendered the election 
improper. Thus, the court remanded the case because the Board, in 
its view, failed to apply the proper legal standard for campaign 
misrepresentations. 
With regard to the defaced sample ballot alone, the court endorsed 
the Board's determination that because the "x" was handwritten, it 
was sufficiently distinct from the Board's printed notice as to 
foreclose any suggestion the mark was endorsed by the Board. 
2. Comment 
The Sixth Circuit's rejection of the Midland Life standard is 
perplexing. There, the NLRB endorsed a hands-off approach to 
campaign rhetoric. By and large, that approach has been seen as one 
which envisions voters as sufficiently sophisticated that they will be 
able to discern truth from falsity in campaign statements. It was 
widely thought that the Board's distancing itself from evaluating 
campaign statements would diminish the number of rerun elections. 
Here, by examining the truth or falsity of the union's campaign 
statements, the court appears to endorse a return to the Board's now 
16. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). 
17. 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
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rejected approach announced in Hollywood Ceramics Co. v. United 
Brick & Clay Workers. 18 
E. DTR Industries, Inc. v. NLRB 19 
This case involved an examination of the reach of protected speech 
.under the NLRA and the use of the bargaining order to remedy unfair 
labor practices. 
DTR, an automobile component manufacturer, petitioned to set 
aside the Board's imposition of a bargaining order. In September, 
1989, the UA W began an organizing campaign and gathered authori-
zation cards from fifty-nine of the approximately seventy-five 
production and maintenance employees of the company. Without 
demanding that the company bargain, the union filed an election 
petition. 
Prior to the outset of the organizing campaign, the company began 
to implement a wage increase consisting of a five percent so-called 
short-term increase to be followed by a long-term wage policy to go 
into effect in October. After the filing of the union petition, the 
company continued to work on the wage policy and on November 
14th, some three days before the election, it received a consultant's 
proposal calling for a wage increase over the ensuing twenty-four 
months. 
During the campaign, two group leaders commented to employees 
that if the union prevailed, certain customers were likely to assign at 
least fifty percent of their business to another contractor. Other 
supervisors allegedly made similar statements as well as comments 
suggesting the petitioner would close its doors if the company were 
unionized. 
On November 10, 1989, the company's president distributed a four 
page letter stating that because the petitioner "sole-sourced"20 to its 
customers, "business would automatically be reduced if the union 
wins the election and our customers took away 50 percent of our sole 
source business."21 The letter also noted that U.S. auto companies 
typically require a unionized supplier to build up a ninety day 
inventory prior to the expiration of the supplier's collective bargaining 
18. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). 
19. 39 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994). 
20. DTR Industries, 39 F.3d at 109. This term referred to a relationship in which the 
company was the sole source of parts to a purchaser. !d. 
21. !d. 
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contract. Then, if a contract is reached without a strike, employee 
layoffs are required to reduce the inventory. The letter concluded: 
Having a union will hurt our business and our chances for success. We 
will lose some or all of our sole source business and create the danger of 
losing the confidence of our customers. Let us show what DTR and its 
associates can do together as a team without the union. You have our 
attention and our commitment. We will listen and ... respond and we will 
have a mutual commitment to each other.22 
Lastly, the company installed suggestion boxes and a toll-free 
telephone number for processing employee comments after the advent 
of the campaign and undertook improvements based on the informa-
tion received through those sources. 
The union lost the election by a single vote and, shortly thereafter, 
the company implemented the wage increase. The union lodged 
NLRA section 8(a)(l) and section 8(a)(5) charges, alleging that the 
wage increase, threats of plant closures or layoffs, the new grievance 
procedure, and the interrogation of at least one employee warranted 
the imposition of a bargaining order. 
The ALJ rejected NLRA section 8(a)(5) allegation finding that 
union agents had misrepresented the purpose of the authorization 
cards to at least thirty-one of the fifty-nine card signers. The ALJ did 
find, however, that the petitioner had violated section 8(a)(l) of the 
Act and issued a cease and desist order, but not a bargaining order. 
On appeal, the Board determined that the union had not misrepresent-
ed the purpose of the authorization cards and, consequently, issued a 
bargaining order. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit recited the three elements necessary to support 
a bargaining order: First, that the union has obtained authorization 
cards from a majority of unit employees free from misrepresentation; 
second, that the employer has dissipated significantly the union's 
majority by unfair labor practices; and, third, that a fair election 
cannot be held. 23 The Sixth Circuit also cited with approval the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB,24 
which required a showing that the illegalities will have a lingering 
22. /d. 
23. /d. at 112 (quoting M.P.C. Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 
1990)). 
24. 904 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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and pervasive effect and that "less drastic remedies are insufficient to 
warm the chill. "25 A less rigorous showing is required where the 
Board has demonstrated so-called "hallmark" violations including 
discriminatory discharges or threatened plant closures. 
In the instant matter, the court found that the Board's finding of 
a threatened plant closure was not supported by the evidence. Instead, 
the court found that the company president's statement - that 
companies that sole-sourced with the petitioner were likely to split 
their business in order to have an alternative supply source in the 
event of a strike - was a prediction based on his belief as to the 
probable consequences of unionization. In the court's view, these 
comments were based upon factors beyond his control and were not 
threats of economic reprisal. In addition, the court found the other 
violations to fall short of the "hallmark" variety necessary to support 
a bargaining order.26 Consequently, the court found a bargaining 
order inappropriate. 
F. NLRB v. Great Scot, Inc. 27 
Employees at two of the company's three stores in northern Ohio 
were represented by the United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union, Local 954; employees at the third store were unrepresented. 
Nonemployee union organizers began picketing on a public easement 
at store number three. When the store manager asked the agents to 
leave and they refused, he called the police. The police, in tum, told 
the store manager he would need a court order to remove the 
picketers. 
Great Scot filed a civil trespass action and the court issued a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting union trespass and restricting 
union activity to the easement. The union subsequently lodged a 
NLRA section 8(a)(l) charge alleging the company had unlawfully 
interfered with its picketing and handbilling activities which it 
characterized as area-standards activity designed to demonstrate that 
the company's wages and benefits were substandard. The staff 
organizer testified he relied on information supplied by his predeces-
sor in concluding that the company's wages and benefits were 
25. DTR Industries, 39 F.3d at 112 (citing Montgomery Ward, 904 F.2d at 1159). 
26. !d. at 115. Also relevant to the court's determination was its observation that in 
the 4 years following the election, the bargaining unit increased from approximately 75 to 
nearly 250 employees and that only 53 of the original 75 employees were still employed./d. 
27. 39 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 1994). 
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"substandard." He did not, he said, undertake any independent 
investigation of the wages and benefits. 
The ALJ observed that the picketing would be unprotected if, in 
fact, the company's wages and benefits were not substandard. His 
decision, however, placed the burden upon the company to show that 
the activity was unprotected. The NLRB affirmed. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit noted that the core activity protected by section 
7 of the Act is the right of employees, as opposed to nonemployee 
union organizers, to form and organize labor organizations. Even 
further removed from NLRA section 7 protection, the court said, are 
the activities of nonemployees, who seek not to organize but to 
communicate with the public. That is, the court observed, nonem-
ployee area-standards picketing warrants even less protection than 
nonemployee organizational activity. 
To support area-standards picketing, the court said, the union 
bears the "heavy burden" of showing that the claims of substandard 
wages and benefits are made in good faith, based on actual knowledge 
gleaned from investigation of conditions existing at the time picketing 
is initiated. 
Because the union bears a duty to investigate wages alleged to be 
substandard before area-standards picketing will be lawful, it has the 
burden of investigating the prevailing standards in the area as well as 
the claimed disparity. Here, the court concluded, the union failed to 
offer sufficient proof that this burden had been met. Consequently, 
the court concluded, inasmuch as the evidence did not support a 
finding that NLRA section 7 activity had been implicated, the unfair 
labor practice charges were insupportable. 
2. Discussion 
The primary focus in this decision, interestingly, was the nature 
of the investigation conducted by the union into alleged substandard 
wages and benefits. There was little discussion in the case about the 
standards themselves and whether they were, in fact, substandard. 
Instead, the decision appears to concentrate on the procedure used by 
the union to determine whether such "standards" were met, and 
underscores the court's view that there is a procedural prerequisite to 
lawful area-standards picketing. 
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G. NLRB v. Cook Family Foods, Ltd. 28 
This case was a straightforward NLRA section 8(a)(3) case 
susceptible to plain analysis under NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp. 29 Four employees of the company were hired and 
subjected to a "trial period" during which the company evaluated job 
performance.30 The employees in question were trained to bag hams 
proceeding along a conveyor belt. Over a period of time, the 
employees were observed slowing production down by letting hams 
pass by without bagging them. Although production would improve 
when the employees were counselled, the misconduct would later 
recur. After an investigation, the employees were fired. 
The evidence showed that a company representative had observed 
the employees distributing handbills and that they circulated union 
organizing petitions. In addition, the evidence also showed that one 
employee had complained to supervision about the temperature in the 
production room and the speed at which the line progressed. 
As to the ensuing NLRA section 8(a)(3) allegation, the ALJ found 
that the employees' NLRA section 7 activity had been a substantial 
or motivating factor in their termination. The ALJ further found that 
the company had failed to show that but for the employees' union 
activity, they would nevertheless have been terminated. Consequent-
ly, the ALJ determined that the company had breached section 8(a)(3) 
of the Act. The NLRB affirmed. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit reversed . the NLRB, essentially upon the 
grounds that, in their view, the evidence demonstrated that the 
employees would have been terminated whether or not they had been 
active in the union. The group leader had spoken to the employees 
repeatedly about their performance problems. Moreover, other 
baggers were conscientious in their work, and the delays caused by 
the discharged employees had created additional work for their co-
workers. Indeed, one worker had asked for a transfer. 
Having found substantial evidence that the employees were fired 
for poor performance, and that but for their union activity they would 
have been fired nonetheless, the charges were dismissed. 
28. 47 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1995). 
29. 462 u.s. 393 (1983). 
30. Cook, 47 F.3d at 811. 
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H. Manor West, Inc. v. NLRB31 
This matter involved the definition of "supervisor" under section 
2(11) of the Act. Here, a licensed practical nurse ("LPN") was 
terminated after "rumors" circulated that she had encouraged aides to 
stage a walk-out to protest working conditions. The ALJ found that 
the employee was not a supervisor and, consequently, that she was 
subject to the statute. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ's finding that the 
employee's termination offended section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the ALJ and the Board, 
concluding that the LPN was a supervisor under the Act and, 
therefore, outside its protection. Under the Act, supervisors are 
defined as: 
[I]ndividual[s] having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their 
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with 
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 32 
The court characterized the Board as having ruled that the LPN 
was not a supervisor because her authority to direct the work of aides 
and orderlies was in the interest of patient care and not in the 
employer's interest. The court criticized this approach as being 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Health 
Care & Retirement Corp. of America. 33 
Inasmuch as the ALJ and the Board based their decisions upon a 
"false dichotomy," the court reasoned, the evidence did not support 
the Board's determination that the LPN was not a supervisor. 
Consequently, the Board's petition to enforce its order was denied and 
its decision reversed. 
I. NLRB v. Spring Arbor Distribution Co. 34 
In this matter, the NLRB sought to enforce its order against the 
company, a distributor of religious books. The UAW lost an initial 
31. 60 F.3d 1195 (6th Cir. 1995). 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994). 
33. 511 u.s. 571 (1994). 
34. 59 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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election by a margin of seventy-one votes in support of the union and 
seventy-six opposed. The UA W then filed objections as to the 
employer's preelection misconduct. The hearing officer recommended 
the election be set aside and the company appealed that determination. 
While the Board was reviewing the appeal, the company an-
nounced it would convert its warehouse into a distribution center, and 
that employees would be laid off in the near future. The Board 
upheld the hearing officer's recommendation that the election be set 
aside, and a second election was conducted. Of the 119 employees 
voting, some 86 were challenged as ineligible. The Board ordered the 
ballots counted and the union prevailed by a vote of seventy-two to 
forty-seven. The UA W was then certified as the collective bargaining 
representative. 
The company refused to bargain with the union. After the ALJ 
and the Board found the company in breach of section 8(a)(5) of the 
Act, the Board sought enforcement of its order in the Sixth Circuit. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Board. The court concluded that 
the Regional Director had erroneously found the layoffs to be 
speculative, and his decision did not address the company's argument 
that the unit was contracting at the time of the election. 
In support of its petition, the Board argued that it was not 
unreasonable for the Regional Director to have concluded that the date 
of the layoffs was indefinite. For two reasons, however, the court 
found the Regional Director's reasoning in dismissing the objections 
to have been flawed. First, the court said, the appropriate standard is 
not whether the decision was reasonable, but rather, whether it was 
based on substantial evidence. Second, the Regional Director never 
conducted the analysis necessary to determine the appropriateness of 
the unit in the contracting unit situation. 
The court found the record devoid of any evidence to support the 
conclusion that the layoffs were speculative. The company had 
distributed a monthly newsletter detailing the reasons for the layoff 
as well as a booklet dealing with the issues involved in relocating 
their warehouse. Lastly, all employees received letters detailing when 
the layoffs would begin. Having concluded that the Board erred by 
declining to engage in the balancing analysis appropriate to a petition 
for election in a contracting unit, the Board's petition was denied. 
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J. Gratiot Community Hospital v. NLRB35 
This case involved unilateral changes in two policies and whether 
those changes constituted violations of the Act. 
In the spring of 1991, the hospital, after undergoing severe 
financial losses, met with the union to discuss cost-cutting measures. 
When these discussions were not fruitful, the hospital unilaterally 
initiated two changes: First, despite a long-standing practice of 
providing laundered scrub uniforms, the hospital informed unit 
employees that it would no longer do so; and second, the hospital 
eliminated a program under which registered nurses could work 
seventy hours for eighty hours pay. The ALJ and the Board conclud-
ed that the hospital violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to 
bargain with the union prior to implementing these changes. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Board in part and reversed in part. 
With regard to the scrub uniform policy, the court observed that 
"scrub" suits are a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Act and 
that, consequently, any change in the policy would be subject to 
obligatory negotiation. In this matter, the court concluded that the 
hospital gave actual notice to the union of the impending change and 
announced it in such definite terms so as to leave the impression that 
the hospital was not willing to enter into good-faith negotiations. 
Moreover, the court determined that the hospital bypassed the union 
and communicated directly with the employees, also in violation of 
its duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 
With respect to the elimination of the special shift policy, 
however, the court concluded that it was within the hospital's 
contractual authority to determine the number of shifts. Consequent-
ly, its decision to eliminate the special shift program was within its 
contractual rights and not in violation of the NLRA. 
K. Calatrello v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Americd6 
The company, during a period of economic decline, decided to lay 
off all sprinkler installation, maintenance and service employees and 
35. 51 F.3d 1255 (6th Cir. 1995). 
36. 55 F.3d 208 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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subcontract that work to outside vendors. The company's plan 
specifically stated that its purpose was to control labor costs, eliminate 
labor negotiations, avoid union contracts and costs associated with 
grievances. By April 1, 1994, the company had subcontracted all of 
its sprinkler installation operations and laid off all its fitter employees. 
It also liquidated all construction vehicles, tools, and equipment. 
The Regional Director issued a complaint against the company for 
failing to bargain in good faith with respect to these changes and 
sought injunctive relief in district court. The district court denied the 
injunction, however, on the grounds that the Board had failed to show 
reasonable cause to believe that the company had committed an unfair 
labor practice and that injunctive relief was just and proper. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit determined that the district court had erred by 
finding that the Board had not carried its burden of establishing 
reasonable cause to believe the subcontracting plan was in violation 
of section 8(a)(3) of the Act. First, the court observed, the stated 
purpose of the plan was to "avoid being a signatory to any union 
contract, pay its demands and work rules. "37 This, the court found, 
was direct evidence that the subcontracting decision was discrim-
inatorily motivated. Moreover, the court ruled, probative evidence 
indicated that the chairman of the board of directors and the chief 
executive officer had repeatedly expressed a desire to convert the 
company into a nonunion enterprise. Finally, the evidence showed 
that the company did not bargain in good faith inasmuch as it 
presented the local unions with afait accompli. Indeed, some local 
unions were not notified until after the changes had been completed. 
Despite these findings, the court nevertheless affirmed the lower 
court's denial of injunctive relief, fmding that such relief was not just 
and proper. To return the parties to the status quo, the court found, 
would impose a substantial financial burdeq which might cause the 
company's demise for which there would be no remedy. In this 
regard, the company produced evidence that it had suffered financial 
losses by using its own employees in certain operations. In addition, 
the company had already subcontracted all its labor work and had sold 
its tools, equipment, and materials. A return to the status quo would 
obligate the company to buy back tools, equipment and materials, to 
37. Ca/atrel/o, 55 F.3d at 213. 
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lease vehicles for work and to hire employees. These actions would 
cost the company more than six million dollars. Thus, the court 
affirmed the judgment of the district court, without prejudice to the 
Board, to seek a narrower injunction. 
L. Armco Employees Independent Federation, Inc. v. Armco 
Steel Co. 38 
In this matter, the plaintiff, a union, sued the company under 
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,39 to 
enforce an arbitration award rendered under the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. The district court granted the company's 
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it lacked jurisdic-
tion because the union sought relief beyond the scope of the arbit-
rator's award. 
In 1991 and 1992, the union filed grievances alleging that the 
company had failed to maintain workforce levels guaranteed in the 
contract. In November 1992, an arbitrator ruled that the company had 
breached the contract and ordered it to maintain a specific number of 
craft employees under certain circumstances and to post sufficient 
openings to comply with this requirement. In this instance, the union 
contended that two months after the arbitrator's decision, the company 
twice violated the order by failing to maintain proper staffing levels. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit, citing United Paperworkers International Union 
v. Misco, Inc.,40 observed that where parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement have elected to have their disputes resolved by 
arbitration, "' [ c ]ourts ... have no business weighing the merits of the 
grievance"'41 and, instead, must defer to the arbitration process. The 
court wrote that '" [b ]ecause the parties have contracted to have 
disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a 
38. 65 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 1995). 
39. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994) (originally enacted as Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, tit. 
III, § 301, 61 Stat. 156). 
40. 484 u.s. 29 (1987). 
41. Armco, 65 F.3d at 496 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. 
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960)). 
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judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the 
contract that they have agreed to accept. "'42 
In this matter the court determined that an arbitrator, not the 
district court, was the proper entity to determine whether the company 
breached the contract after the arbitrator's award. Until an arbitrator 
examined the parties' positions on that allegation, the court ruled, it 
could not supplant the parties' agreed-upon method of dispute 
resolution. 
Having found that the parties elected to have disputes over the 
meaning of their contract arbitrated, the district court's decision 
dismissing the union's suit for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. 
M. Local 58, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. 
National Electrical Contractors Ass 'n43 
The parties' collective bargaining agreement contained an interest 
arbitration clause which provided that "[u]nresolved issues in negotia-
tions that remain on the 20th of the month preceding the next regular 
meeting of the Council on Industrial Relations, may be submitted 
jointly or unilaterally by the parties to this Agreement to the Council 
for adjudication prior to the anniversary date of the Agreement."44 
In exchange, the parties agreed to forgo the use of a strike or lockout. 
In this matter, the employer timely notified the union that it 
sought certain changes in the contract, including the creation of a 
"material handlers" job classification. The union objected, claiming 
that the introduction of this classification would threaten the wages, 
benefits, working conditions and standard of living of its members. 
Instead, the union demanded that all bargaining unit work remain with 
journeymen and apprentices, regardless of the skill level necessary for 
the task. 
Failing to obtain consensus on this and other issues, the parties 
submitted several issues to arbitration in accordance with the interest 
arbitration clause of the contract. The Council on Industrial Rela-
tion's ("CIR") first decision resolved all issues presented except the 
material handlers question. The CIR remanded that issue to the 
parties for further negotiation. 
The parties continued to negotiate, but failed to resolve their 
disagreement. Consequently, they returned to the CIR. In its second 
42. /d. (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38). 
43. 43 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995). 
44. Local 58, 43 F.3d at 1029. 
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decision, the CIR ordered the parties to sign a material handlers 
agreement which defined the scope of work involved, the wages, 
hours, and benefits for material handlers. It was this order to which 
the union objected. 
The district court upheld the CIR' s award finding that it did not 
exceed its authority under the parties' agreement. As a result, the 
union's action was dismissed. 
1. Sixth Circuit Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed.· the lower court. Citing Misco, the 
Sixth Circuit emphasized the principle that a court must defer to an 
arbitrator's decision that "draws its essence" from the contract and 
must enforce an arbitration award that is not contrary to public policy. 
Indeed, the court held that even greater deference was called for when 
an arbitrator is engaged in interest arbitration, as opposed to grievance 
arbitration. The court reasoned: 
Interest arbitration, unlike grievance arbitration, focuses on what the terms 
of a new agreement should be, rather than the meaning of the terms of the 
old agreement. Thus, the arbitrator is not acting as a judicial officer, 
construing the terms of an existing agreement and applying them to a 
particular set of facts. Rather, he is acting as a legislator, fashioning new 
contractual obligations. Consequently we recognize that even greater 
deference must be paid to the arbitrator's decision, once it is established 
that he had the authority to resolve the issue.45 
The parties' contract limited the authority of the CIR to proposed 
"changes" to the agreement. Here, the union argued that the creation 
of a separate agreement governing the "material handlers" classifica-
tion could not be considered a "change" in the contract because it 
established an entirely separate contractual relationship. 
The Sixth Circuit rejected the union's argument. It held that the 
underlying agreement contained no clear prohibition as to the creation 
of a material handlers classification and, indeed, concluded that the 
CIR's decision was rationally derived from the terms of the underly-
ing contract. 
In addition to its contractual argument, the union contended that 
the material handlers agreement was unenforceable for statutory 
reasons. In essence, the union contended that the CIR' s decision 
improperly included two nonmandatory subjects of bargaining -
interest arbitration and the scope of the unit. As to these arguments, 
45. !d. at 1030 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38). 
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the court concluded that the interest arbitration clause was, indeed, a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining46 and, hence, not within the 
arbitrator's authority to order. Consequently, the court determined 
that the interest arbitration provision in the material handlers 
agreement should be excised from the arbitrator's award. 
With respect to the impact of the arbitrator's decision on the scope 
of the unit, however, the court concluded that the award affected work 
assignments and did not, as the union claimed, alter the scope of the 
bargaining unit. The court wrote that "[t]here is no basis for deciding 
that a regrouping of work tasks with an accompanying pay decrease 
impacts the scope of the bargaining unit. "47 Finding the creation of 
the material handlers classification to have been a mandatory subject 
of bargaining, the court concluded that the CIR had the authority to 
resolve the dispute under the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
In the author's opinion, three ofthe court's labor and employment 
cases described here were significant in terms of furthering doctrinal 
development. In Johnson & Hardin Co. v. NLRB,48 the court found 
broadly in favor of the right of nonemployee union organizers to 
solicit on public easements. In NLRB v. Hub Plastics, Jnc.,49 the 
court suggested it would exercise far greater supervision over 
campaign rhetoric than the National Labor Relations Board. Finally, 
in NLRB v. Great Scot, Inc. ,50 the court established a procedural 
prerequisite to lawful area-standards picketing, requiring that the 
union undertake an investigation of prevailing wages and benefits as 
well as those of the employer under scrutiny. In the remaining cases, 
the court appeared primarily to solidify well established doctrine. 
46. See Electrical Workers IBEW Local 135, 271 N.L.R.B. 250 (1984). 
47. Local 58, 43 F.3d at 1033. 
48. 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995). 
49. 52 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 1995). 
50. 39 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 1994). 
